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By 2025 the world’s population will have grown by another 1.8
billion or so, bringing it to roughly 8 billion. Ninety-ﬁve percent of the
increment will be in what today are called developing countries; only 5
percent will be in the rich industrialized countries. Indeed, birth rates
have fallen below the replacement rate (about 2.1 children per female of
childbearing age) in all the rich countries, as well as in Slavic Europe,
Russia, and China. The birth rate is down to 1.35 in Japan and to an
extraordinary low of 1.2 in Italy. Demographic inertia will lead to
continued population increase for a decade or more in many of these
countries, especially China. But in the longer run, population (and,
presumably, labor force) growth will turn negative. Indeed, it is already
negative in Japan.
These low birth rates, combined with steadily increasing longevity,
imply aging societies, with a number of important implications for the
nature of economies and societies. The implications for pensions, health
care, and nursing care are usually mentioned. In addition, however, there
will be profound changes in other dimensions about which we can only
speculate, as we have had no experience in managing societies with
secular declines in population since the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution two centuries ago.
Some obvious points are that the demand for traditional education—
schools, textbooks, and teachers—will decline with declining numbers of
children. The demand for housing—and for consumer durables to ﬁll the
housing—will fall with declines in new household formation. Hence-
forth, demand will be conﬁned to replacement, plus new products and
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replacement, unless other peoples follow Americans in acquiring second
or even third cars per family.
There will be fewer new entrants to the labor force, implying lower
productivity growth for two quite different reasons. First, learning by
doing (acquisition of experience) is presumably most rapid among new
entrants to the labor force, so productivity growth will fall as the ratio of
new entrants declines. Second, new entrants are presumably the most
mobile members of the labor force, particularly in those countries, such as
Japan and continental Europe, with practices (sometimes reinforced by
law) of long-term employment with a single employer; so inter-sectoral
mobility of the labor force will decline, reducing the economy’s ﬂexibility
to respond to changes in patterns of demand or competitiveness.
Finally, as Nicholas Eberstadt has pointed out, there will be drastic
changes in social relations, particularly those concerning the family. If
Italy’s low birth rate were to continue for two generations, for instance,
almost 60 percent of that nation’s children would have no siblings, no
cousins, no aunts or uncles; conversely, less than 5 percent of children
would have both siblings and cousins. In short, the extended family
(beyond grandparents and, increasingly, great-grandparents) would vir-
tually disappear, and with it its role in the socialization of new genera-
tions of youngsters. What will provide the substitute?
Declines in growth of the labor force could be postponed by
increasing labor force participation rates—most obviously of women, but
increasingly also of the aged, made possible by the better health of
“senior citizens.” There is no reason why the increased leisure made
possible by rising productivity should be taken predominantly or exclu-
sively as more retirement years. Rather, working years could be extended
with improved health, and the working week made more ﬂexible in
timing and length throughout one’s working life. Flexibility of the labor
market could be enhanced by breaking the practice of “lifetime” employ-
ment with single employers, by encouraging employment at all ages, and
by improving the institutional arrangements for lifelong learning, thus
extending the educational sector beyond K–12 plus four years of college.
Labor force adaptability will be required in a world of continual technical
change, in which the working place can be radically transformed not only
once but even twice in a single (ever-lengthening) lifetime.
The outlook for the United States is quite different from that for
Europe and Japan, partly because the birth rate (about 1.9 children per
female) has not (yet) fallen so far, but also because the country remains
(along with Australia and Canada) open to extensive immigration.
Indeed, it does a remarkable job of integrating immigrants and especially
their children into American society.
Immigration deserves much greater attention than it normally re-
ceives in discussions of aging in the United States and other rich
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people in the countries of the world, 2.3 percent of the world popula-
tion—the same percentage as in 1965. The rich industrialized (OECD)
countries had 54 million of them, 4.5 percent of their population, up from
3.1 percent in 1965, demonstrating an increase on average of 2.3 percent
a year. The United States had 20 million foreign-born in 1990, double the
number in 1965 and representing a rise from 5.1 to 7.9 percent of the U.S.
population, up 2.9 percent a year.1 As noted above, over a billion people
will be added to the world population in the next decade and a half,
overwhelmingly in developing countries, many of which are struggling
for growth and burdened with high urban unemployment as people
increasingly migrate from rural areas to cities. As labor force growth in
rich countries declines, farms, ﬁrms, and governments (including the
armed forces) will have increasing difﬁculty recruiting. Firms (and farms,
especially at harvest time) will press for more imported foreign workers.
Why should not these developments in supply and demand for labor,
now separated by national boundaries, be matched?
Immigration is rarely discussed as a policy variable, but it should be.
U.S. Census population projections simply assume constant net immigra-
tion into the United States for the indeﬁnite future (at 820,000 a year in the
middle variant).2 That is not consistent with historical experience, nor is
it consistent with a signiﬁcant decline in natural population growth in the
future. Yet the projections would be altered signiﬁcantly by assuming a
proportionate rise in immigration, even more a disproportionate rise to
compensate for the shortfall in natural growth.
Suppose, for instance, that immigration into the United States were
allowed to increase over the period to 2025 at a rate rapid enough to keep
the “dependency ratio”—the ratio of non-working-age population to
working-age population—approximately what it was in 2000. Assuming
no change in participation rates or in tax structure, such a condition
would retain the relationship between taxpaying residents and non-
taxpaying residents that obtained at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst
century—a ratio that generated overall budget surpluses and a surplus in
the Social Security Trust Fund.
The U.S. dependency ratio is projected (Census Bureau 2000, middle
variant) to rise from 0.618 to 0.734 between 2000 and 2025. I will make the
strong assumption that all additional immigrants (over the levels as-
1 Interestingly, foreign-born persons made up a higher fraction of the labor force than
of the total population in Australia, Canada, and the United States, whereas the reverse was
generally true in Europe and Japan. Evidently immigrants had larger-than-average families
in Europe, and/or they were drawn by the relatively generous welfare programs there.
2 The Census projections of 2000 drop this constant rate of net immigration in favor of
a trajectory that falls from 970,000 in 2000 to 720,000 in 2010 and then rises to 918,000 in
2025—a ﬁgure that is below the immigration assumed for 2000. This trajectory provides a
better starting point, but a decline of 250,000 in the annual number of immigrants over the
next ten years seems implausible.
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age, 18 to 64. (This would of course require a substantial alteration of the
existing heavy emphasis on family uniﬁcation in the Immigration Act of
1990, but only for the incremental migrants; family uniﬁcation on its
current scale could continue. Political refugees could also continue at
their current level of over 100,000 a year.)
To return the 2025 dependency ratio to the 2000 level would require
admission of 36.4 million extra immigrants over this twenty-ﬁve-year
period, an average of 1.46 million a year. That would nearly treble the
immigration assumed in the projections, but I believe it is manageable.
Provided the immigrants were well-diversiﬁed as to source—in practice,
that most of the increment did not come from Mexico and Central
America—the United States could absorb this number of additional
immigrants. By assumption, they are of working age, so they should not
put heavy initial burdens on schools, welfare, or Social Security.
The incremental immigration could sensibly be admitted on a rising
trajectory, rather than, as in current ofﬁcial projections, at a constant level.
Thus the incremental immigration could start, say, at 500,000 a year—
only a small increase on the over 1 million immigrants thought to enter
the United States annually today, counting illegal immigrants—and rise
to 2.4 million a year by 2025 to yield the average of 1.46 million a year. Of
course, to the extent the immigrant participation rate exceeded the
average for Americans, the total number of immigrants could be lower
and still result in the desired additions to the labor force. Moreover, many
of them could be admitted as contract workers rather than full-time
immigrants, being engaged, for instance, in seasonal farm work or
contract construction.
An effort to retain the dependency ratio of 2000 is of course arbitrary.
Smaller numbers of additional immigrants could nonetheless help com-
pensate for the economic and ﬁscal problems created by a declining birth
rate and increased longevity. The calculation above is designed, rather, to
show that retention of the current dependency ratio through immigration
could be possible.
The United States is fortunate in having a tradition of successful
immigration. The demographic decline is greater in Europe and Japan
than it is in the United States, and the tradition for absorbing immigrants
is less strong—although in fact Germany today has a higher ratio of
“foreign-born” population than does the United States. Immigration
alone is therefore less feasible there as a total solution to the problems
created by demographic decline.3
3 Enlargement of the European Union by the twelve applicants would, no doubt, result
in substantial additional immigration into the current ﬁfteen members, whose per capita
incomes are substantially higher than those of the applicants. But such migration would
aggravate demographic decline in the applicant countries, most of which have also
experienced sharp reductions in birth rates.
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likely to be observed in the coming decades suggests a prediction:
Immigration into all rich countries will occur on a much greater scale than
is currently envisioned in ofﬁcial population projections, illegally if not
legally; on balance such immigration will be more welcome than it seems
to be at present. Indeed, it will even be encouraged.
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